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Abstract: This study aims at analyzing objectively various techniques and methods of money 
laundering, both in classical and modern ways, by presenting case studies from the legal practice in 
Romania, in an attempt to clarify a number of issues related to the compl
and future tendencies of financial criminals for 
analysis of comparative law performed in the last chapter, we highlighted a number of similarities and 
differences between the Romanian legislation and the legislative laws of other states, surprising the 
forms and effects of money 
measures for preventing and fighting against these crimes adopted by the analyzed legal systems. The 
comparative approach of the criminal and legal framework of preventing and combating
laundering is essential for the Romanian legal system efficiency in this matter.
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1. Argument 
Money laundering, the process by which the proceeds of criminal
are filtered through a multitude of transactions in order to give an 
appearance of legality, is one of the most complex problems that the 
international community is facing. We note that, although lately there are 
many monographs and studies dedic
laundering, the depletion of this topic seems to be unattainable. Hence also 
the necessity and timeliness of this investigation of this crime; the research 
must be comprehensive, detailed and well reasoned.
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2. The Theoretical and Practical Importance 
The theoretical and practical importance of this scientific approach is shaped 
by the destabilizing effects that this crime has on the society, on the 
financial, economic, banking, and commercial system. Identifying the 
methods, techniques and money laundering typologies is particularly 
important in order to adopt the most appropriate policies and strategies in 
order to combat financial crime and to identify new methods and trends and 
other areas vulnerable to money laundering infiltration. (Bogdan, 2010, p. 
90) 
Equally relevant is also the understanding of the evolution over time of 
these tendencies, the context that determined that, in a certain period of 
time, they are used by specifically by financial criminals. Also, according to 
the comparative law analysis performed in the last chapter, we highlighted a 
number of similarities and differences between the Romanian legislation 
and legislative laws of other states, by underlining the forms and effects of 
money laundering on the studied national systems as well as highlighting 
measures of preventing and combating this crime adopted by the analyzed 
legal systems. The comparative approach of the legal and criminal 
framework of prevention and fight against money laundering is essential for 
the Romanian legal system efficiency in this matter. 
 
3. Research Objectives 
This study aims at objectively analyze and describe various techniques and 
methods of money laundering, both classical and modern ways by 
presenting case studies of legal practice in Romania, in an attempt to clarify 
a series of complex aspects of this crime, of current and future trends of 
financial criminals for laundering proceeds of crime. 
 
4. Specific Research Methods 
In carrying out this scientific approach, there were involved various 
methods specific to the scientific research. Thus, documentation, 
bibliographic research, comparative study of laws of other states in matters 
of money laundering, the analysis of judicial practice in both Romania and 
other EU countries are the used methods in order to achieve the mentioned 
above research objectives. 
JURIDICA 
 
87 
 
5. Summary of Theoretical Content of the Thesis 
From the structural point of view, the paper contains six chapters and 
conclusions and proposals for lege ferenda.  
In the first chapter, entitled Money laundering. Concept and stages, there 
were analyzed the various definitions of money laundering from foreign and 
national specialized literature and doctrine. In our opinion, according to the 
analysis of the presented definitions in this chapter, by money laundering 
we understand the achievement of the complex change of shares or transfer 
of certain goods having the purpose of hiding or concealing their illicit 
origin, the acquisition, possession or use of goods and any act of 
participation or support in any way to the actions described above. 
Another research direction of this chapter is focused on the stages, money 
laundering basically being achieved in three stages: placement in banks, 
funds, insurance companies, division of illicit funds of small fraction that 
does not attract full attention. Layering, respectively, the empowerment of 
this money by stratification, separation, by making fake documents, 
financial transactions, the creation of phantom companies, through which 
there are achieved wide transfer services or other fake export operations of 
money from one bank to another. The process is concluded by integrating 
the money; it is collected only to return to the legal financial, banking or 
shopping circuit. It is the moment when the money is washed, physically 
transferred abroad or contain other financial banking circuits. (Stroe, 2004, 
p. 307) 
In Chapter II called Techniques and instruments used in money 
laundering schemes, we present the techniques used by money launderers 
to simulate the illicit origin and / or disguise the illicit origin of funds, 
through cash transactions, bank accounts, wire transfers to bank , foreign 
operations and credit operations as well as through investment related to 
transactions. In this study there are also presented a series of examples 
laundering schemes that capture the analyzed techniques, examples from 
NOPCML, DIICOT practice, but also the practice of the courts in Romania 
and other states. 
Most of the states, including Romania, have taken a restrictive regulatory 
policy in the field of online gambling within the meaning of prohibition 
established for gambling operators form other Member States of the 
European Union, within which it lawfully provides these services, to 
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propose online gambling games in the territory of that State.1 Online 
gambling industry brings huge profits to the states that have adopted 
permissive policy, in terms of licensing foreign operators and the possibility 
for them to conduct such activities on their territory. 
The experience of states that have legalized online gambling industry (UK, 
Germany, Italy,2 Malta) by licensing games to a great number of operators, 
monitoring suspicious transactions and the establishment of strict customer 
identification measures (both before opening the user account and along the 
conducted activities throughout the gambling site), collaboration for the 
exchange of information, both between the State authority where the 
operator is established (identity verification through the exchange of 
information between the banking institution to which the user has the 
account, online gambling operator and authorities monitoring the 
transactions carried by the user) and also between these entities from 
different states, it demonstrates that there was an increase of the money 
laundering phenomenon. 
The online auctions, due to the appearance of legality that it grants to the 
washing operation, represent an effective tool for financial criminals. The 
procedure followed by money launderers when using the electronic auctions 
is to register as user on auction site and buying and selling virtual goods 
with real-world correspondent. Thus, the money is transferred to bank 
account of the auction company, which, if there is no problem on the 
property bought or sold, the money is transferred to the buyer. Money 
launderers use online games because the virtual products can be purchased 
and transferred anywhere, and since the virtual withdrawal of funds from the 
account are considered legal, their source cannot be identified. 
The contemporary peculiarities of money laundering, namely: the economic 
magnitude of the phenomenon, the distinguishable transnational feature, its 
links with organized crime, money launderers, professionalism etc. 
represent the reason that justifies our interest to turn our attention also to the 
connections that exist between economic and financial crime and tax 
havens. 
                                                 
1
 According to article 25, letter k) of Law no. 246/2010 for approving GEO no. 77/2009 on the 
organization and operation of gambling, represents a crime the participation in Romania in gambling 
activities which are not authorized in Romania, organized through communication systems such as 
Internet, mobile or fixed systems or any assimilated means. 
2
 We exemplify the case of Italy, the legalization of online gambling increased the turnover in this 
state at an estimation of 3.7 billion euros in 2009 and almost double in 2010. 
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The theoretical premises and the case studies presented in this chapter lead 
us to the conclusion that tax havens are "useful" to money launderers in all 
three stages of the process: placement, layering and integration. Thus, 
placing the illicit money can be achieved by private aircraft or by courier, 
then for layering, there are  achieved consecutive transactions in order to 
insure the loss of any trace that connects the money and its illicit origin and 
the third stage of integration is achieved by creating an appearance of 
legality of revenue - by using front companies registered in tax havens 
providing fake loans through indirect payments for the benefit of the 
taxpayer's family or through personal accounts, the amounts being sent 
under the panel which is reported in open accounts at different banks in 
different jurisdictions. 
We conclude with a remark that the use of different economic and financial 
sectors for laundering the proceeds of crime and the national and 
transnational transactions do not represent a tight compartment for financial 
criminals, but instead they are combined, systematically, in order to engage 
some successive stages necessary for money laundering process. 
In the third chapter called Strategies to prevent and combat money 
laundering adopted at international level, we bring in the center of the 
research the development of international standards that fulfill a key role in 
the states’ efforts to fight against money laundering. 
In this chapter it is discussed the process of developing the international 
standards on money laundering, as a result of the initiatives proposed by the 
international powers. The study follows the chronological development of 
international and European regulations in matters on and assessing the 
impact of international standards upon the laws of various states. 
In the second part of this chapter, were analyzed the measures for the 
prevention of money laundering and financing terrorism acts adopted at 
international level. Thus, there were outlined the advantages based on risk 
based by the entities obliged to establish the costumer’s profile. Prior to 
adopting this approach, the money laundering prevention strategies were 
characterized by determining the risks and the measures that were to be 
taken by the bank, by bank supervisors. Secondly, we notice the progressive 
inclusion of new liberal professions and economic activities in the list of 
reporting entities, and an extension of the diligence obligations. Thirdly, we 
notice the increase of regulations on reporting the suspicious transactions, 
an obligation that regards the reporting entities. The last part of this chapter 
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deals with the implementation of international measures of preventing 
money laundering in the Romanian legislation. 
The incrimination and sanctioning of money laundering in the Romanian 
legislation represents the subject of research of the fourth chapter of the 
thesis. 
The evolution of international concerns to extend the scope of predicate 
offenses from drug trafficking to all serious crimes and then to all criminal 
activities, has determined the Romanian legislator to return to the 
incrimination of money laundering and to eliminate the limitation of this 
crime. Thus, the next legal step after the adoption of Law no. 21/1999 on 
preventing and sanctioning money laundering was the adoption of Law no. 
656/2002 on preventing and sanctioning money laundering and the 
establishment of preventive measures against terrorism financing, a law 
which refers to all crimes that can generate goods liable to laundering.1 
The research undertaken in Chapter V of the paper, entitled Aspects of 
Procedural Law - Criminal in Money Laundering Matters is focused on 
aspects of criminal procedural law of money laundering crime. The offense 
of money laundering requires financial and judicial investigations carried 
out in parallel. The financial investigation is usually conducted by the 
Police2 (specialized units of judiciary police) and, rarely, especially the 
special and national prosecution. The prosecution coordinates or leads the 
pre-trial investigative phase and the financial investigation as part of it. The 
purpose of judicial investigation is to identify the crime and the criminals, 
obtaining evidence for prosecution. 
Law no. 202/2010 regarding some measures to accelerate the settlement of 
process has not made changes in the Law no 656/2002 on preventing and 
                                                 
1
 According to article 23 of Law no. 656/2002 on preventing and sanctioning money laundering and 
to establish measures to prevent and combat terrorism financing through money laundering means: 
"(1) Represents the offense of money laundering and shall be punished with imprisonment from 3 to 
12 years: a) the exchange or transfer of assets, knowing that come from committing crime in order 
to conceal or disguise the illicit origin of such assets or in order to help the person who committed 
the crime from where the assets come, to evade prosecution, trial and execution of the sentence; b) 
the concealment or disguise the true nature of the origin, location, disposition, movement or 
ownership or rights over their property, knowing that the goods come from committing crimes; c) the 
acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing that they come from committing crimes." 
2
 Investigative activities conducted by the police are: gathering evidence on the existence of the 
offense, of the offender and the incomes coming from the criminal activities. Also, the police can 
seize the means (property used in committing a crime), the goods covered by the offense and any 
other evidence. The police may propose (to prosecutor) temporary sequestration measure of goods 
which can be confiscated. 
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sanctioning money laundering and has not established measures to prevent 
and combat terrorism financing, in order to allow the authorities of criminal 
investigation to receive complaints from the National Office for Preventing 
and Combating Money Laundering when it is found that there are solid 
indications of money laundering. (Udroiu, 2010, pp. 24-25)1 
Special investigative measures, namely, the access and surveillance of 
telecommunications or computer systems, the controlled delivery of the 
money and use of undercover investigators used for money laundering are 
particularly useful for providing information on the money trail, origin and 
destination of the illicit transfer and change of proceeds of crime. Also, by 
using these tactics to investigate, there are obtained data and information 
that lead to the identification of the composition, structure, resources and 
activities of organized crime. 
A new legislation on safety measures is the adoption of the Law Draft to 
supplement the Criminal Code and Law no. 286 / 2009 on the Criminal 
Code by which it is inserted the safety measure of extended confiscation. 
By adopting this law there are transposed into Romanian legislation the 
depositions on the confiscation provisions of the European Union for money 
laundering, the Framework Decision no. 2005 / 212/JHA on confiscating 
property, instruments and property derived from criminal offenses.2 This 
Decision provides for the extension of confiscating prerogatives in the case 
of money laundering and the various forms of trafficking (smuggling, 
human trafficking, currency, drugs), in order to facilitate the confiscation 
measure for alternative situations. The confiscation measure is provided also 
in cases where it is established that the property value is disproportionate 
to the illicit income of the convicted person, and a national court, based 
on specific facts, it is fully convinced that the property in question came 
from a criminal activity of the convicted person3. Under the draft of the 
new law the extended confiscation operate in the case where the person is 
convicted of an offense for which the law provides for imprisonment of 
more than 5 years and it is likely to procure a material benefit, the court 
being able to order the confiscation of other assets besides the ones referred 
to in article 118, if the following conditions are fulfilled: a) the assets 
acquired by the person convicted to a period of five years before and, if it is 
                                                 
1
 Available at www.inm-lex.ro. 
2
 Framework Decision no. 2005 / 212 / JHA of 24 February 2005 of European Council, published in 
J.O.L 68 of 15.03.2005. 
3
 Article 3, line 2, letter. c) of Framework Decision no. 2005 / 212 / JHA. 
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the case, by the time the offense was committed before the date of the 
criminal action, clearly exceeding the revenues obtained illicitly; b) the 
court is convinced that these goods come from activities of the kind that 
drew the condemnation. 
Chapter VI of the thesis, entitled Money laundering in the laws of various 
European countries, represent the area of analysis of the peculiarities of the 
European countries’ laws, in relation to money laundering, in order to 
analyze similarities and differences and the degree of homogeneity between 
the national systems of preventing and combating money laundering 
implemented in these countries in order to highlight different legislative 
solutions and judicial practice recorded in various studied countries. 
The differences in national legislation are outlined from the very reason of 
incriminating money laundering offense. Thus, while France incriminated 
money laundering, being concerned with the ineffective results from control 
policy of illicit trafficking of narcotics, which, essentially gets down to 
punishing the petty, street traffickers without being able to reach those who 
obtained significant profits from this kind of trafficking. Switzerland 
adopted a legislation on money laundering and regulations on criminal 
organizations, not because the country had been affected by domestic 
violence but, rather, because it abused of its financial centers and bank 
secrecy rules to hide the assets of criminal groups, and Italy adopted the 
anti-laundering legislation particularly to counter the criminal activities of 
mafia-type groups (Guillermo, 2007, p. 22).1 
Although we are in the presence of a variety of definitions of this crime, we 
see a series of common characteristics: First, the offense is a process, a 
complex of operations involving a multitude of activities in order to achieve 
the aims of the perpetrator. Secondly, the financial object of the offense, no 
matter the name is given in the definitions of goods, money, income, profit, 
assets, etc. it comes from an offense, and thus illicit origin (so there must be 
a predicate offense from where the good of money laundering is 
originating). Also, in most considered definitions, it is always stated the 
purpose of financial criminal, namely, the concealment or disguising the 
illicit origin of the goods and their integration in the legal economic and 
financial circuit. 
Most analyzed states by this study have adopted the instruments and 
strategies to cover all offenses that generate dirty money: in Romania 
                                                 
1
 http://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/romania_illicit_enrichment_report_07_07_rom.pdf. 
JURIDICA 
 
93 
 
(article 23 of Law no. 656/2002 on preventing and sanctioning laundering 
and to establish measures to prevent and combat financing terrorism acts), 
as France (Article 324-1 of the Penal Code.), Britain (Section 340 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act), Ireland (article 31 of the Criminal Justice Act of 
2001) and Switzerland predicate offenses covering all crimes that can 
generate goods which are subject to money laundering. Spain (article 305 of 
the Penal Code) and Austria (article 165 paragraph 1 of the Penal Code.) 
limit the scope of predicate offenses only to those that are considered 
serious offenses for which imprisonment is set higher than 3 years.1 Italy 
covers only those crimes committed intentionally as predicate offenses.2 
Germany (article 261 of the Penal Code) and Portugal (article 368-A of the 
Penal Code) expressly provide for offenses whose products can be washed. 
Knowledge of the perpetrator that the goods subject to washing operations 
come from an offense is an essential condition of the subjective side of this 
offense for most studied countries. In France, according to article 324-1, line 
1 of the Criminal Code, the launderer of money must know the illegal nature 
of the provenance of the goods submitted to laundering, in the version 
provided by article 324-1, line 1 of the Penal Code, or, if it commits the act 
in the manner provided for in article 324-1 line 2, to be aware that the goods 
that have been placed, concealed or converted come from direct or indirect 
proceeds of crime. Spain, by Law no. 5 / 2010 concerning the prevention 
and combating money laundering provided also the reckless fault as a form 
of guilt of the perpetrator. 
On the active subject of crime in comparative law there are states where 
money laundering is a common law crime that can be committed by anyone 
who may be without of the need for any special quality of the active subject. 
On the other hand there are laws that limit the scope of money laundering 
active subjects. The limitation of active subjects’ category of money 
laundering generally refers to the fact that the predicate offender can not be 
also the offender of the money laundering offense. In Germany, prior to 
reform legislation on money laundering it was provided that the assets of 
illicit origin must come from an offense committed by another person.3 In 
Italy, article 648 bis. and third provides money laundering as a special form 
                                                 
1
 Articles 301 and 308 of the Spanish Criminal Code. 
2
 Article 648 bis, Italian Criminal Code. 
3
 In the current German Criminal Code, the article 261 provides the incrimination of the person who 
hides the objects coming from one of the committed acts provided by law, that is all crimes and 
certain misdemeanors, concealing the source or origin jeopardizing the finding out, confiscation, 
seizure of such asset. 
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of offense concealment and the person who participated in committing the 
crime of money or assets previously recycled cannot be an active subject of 
offenses covered by the two legal texts. (Antony, 1997, pp. 40 - 50) Unlike 
these states, there are laws, like in Spain and Switzerland, which do not 
provide any limitation category of active subjects of money laundering 
offense, any person can be the perpetrators of these crimes. British law 
generally deals with money laundering offense, but limiting its subject, 
which is expressed by the low number of convictions in the UK. 
Sanctioning system applied to money laundering has also significant 
differences in the laws of the states covered in this study. Thus, while some 
states apply harsh punishment in the case the money laundering is 
committed by organized criminal groups or people taking advantage of their 
functions as well as by those who commit the act as occupation (Germany, 
France, Italy), other states do not cover all crimes related to high risk drugs 
seizures as crime generators of dirty money, thus remaining certain sides of 
organized crime outside the prosecution (Austria). 
The safety measure for special confiscation in case of the money 
laundering offense is required by all studied laws. Some states, like Britain 
and Switzerland have established, in addition to the special confiscation also 
the extended confiscation, this measure proved its practical utility by 
recovering some large sums of money and values which caused a prejudice 
to the state budget. UK provided the special confiscation procedure on 
proceeds of crime (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002). In certain circumstances, 
the court may use the presumption of the provenance of the assets of the 
convicted in committing an illicit activity, on a prior period of 6 years 
(Hoffman, 2008, p. 115). In Swiss law, in case of a person prosecuted for 
supporting or participating in a criminal organization, the court shall order 
the confiscation of all assets belonging to this person.1 
We conclude with a remark that although both at international and European 
level there have been adopted guidelines for a coherent global model of 
preventing and combating money laundering, real legislative instruments, if 
states will implement them uniformly, without achieving an harmonization 
                                                 
1
 According to article 72 of the Swiss Criminal Code, the criminal organization controls the assets of 
its members, being established as a presumption of illegal character of the assets of members of such 
organizations, the burden of the evidence of the illicit origin is distributed to the defense department, 
the defendant having the possibility of demonstrating either that the goods are not under the control of 
organized criminal organization or that they have lawful origin. 
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of national laws, the criminals will continue to benefit from these legislative 
differences. 
The last part of our scientific endeavor outlines a series of conclusions and 
proposals de lege ferenda, as follows: 
1. We believe that the prohibition of online gambling is not the best way to 
prevent crimes that can penetrate in this industry. De lege ferenda, we 
propose to maintain the provisions of Law no. 246/2010 for approving 
G.E.O. no. 77/2009 on the organization and operation of gambling, which 
allows the development of such activities in Romania, conditioned by the 
approval of this activity. Of course, this law must be constantly adjusted 
depending on consumer preferences and the services offered by the online 
gambling operators. 
2. In our view, tax havens can be defined as that jurisdiction that creates 
intentionally its own legislation intended to facilitate economic and 
financial transactions undertaken by non-residents on its territory, in order 
to avoid taxation and the application of certain rules of law or regulations 
specific to other jurisdictions through a mechanism that creates a legal wall 
that the beneficiaries use for these transactions. 
Analyzing the Romania's legislation we find that there is no definition or set 
of criteria to determine the defining characteristics of tax havens, though in 
practice, there were numerous cases of companies (offshore) registered in 
such jurisdictions involved often enough in money laundering schemes or 
criminal activities; they introduced their illegal incomes in the state of their 
"headquarters" either through fictitious contracts of loan or by selling 
intangible assets. De lege ferenda, we propose, for a better integration in the 
international system of combating the economic and financial crime to 
establish an objective definition of tax havens also by the Romanian 
legislator, a concept that is based on tax rates, a legal system of 
guaranteeing confidentiality of the financial and economic information on 
the entities that can sustain economic and financial operations by their 
means. 
3. One of the issues on which we insisted on this study is the category of 
politically exposed persons who pose a high risk of money laundering and 
terrorism acts financing. Thus, according to Community legislation 
(Recommendation no. 6 FATF and the provisions of Directive 2005/60/EC), 
reporting entities must implement additional measures of diligence in case 
of transactions or business relationships with politically exposed persons 
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                    No. 3/2011 
 
96 
who are resident in another Member State of the European Union or 
European Economic Area or in a third country. According to article 21, line 
1 of Law no. 656 / 2002, as amended and supplemented, the politically 
exposed persons are individuals who work or have worked in prominent 
public functions, their immediate family members and persons publicly 
known to be close associates of individuals exerting important public 
functions. The Romanian legislation, the status of politically exposed person 
requiring the appliance of enhanced diligence measures, stop after reaching 
a period of one year from the date on which he ceased to occupy important 
public function provided by article 2. 
In our opinion, the distinction between resident and non-resident politically 
exposed persons, in terms of the high-risk money laundering and terrorism 
financing, should be eliminated. We reason this view by sustaining that, 
whether politically exposed person is resident or not of the state, it is subject 
to the same pressures and corrupt inducements, the treatment of these 
categories, in terms of risk assessment should be the same. Secondly, we do 
not consider that, by applying the enhanced diligence measures and to 
customers - politically exposed persons that are residents, the activity of 
reporting entities would be more difficult, at least in terms of identifying the 
politically exposed persons that are residents. Thirdly, the reporting entity's 
reputation is also affected in case the transactions or business relationships 
are suspected of money laundering or terrorist financing which are 
connected to a resident politically exposed person, so the reputational risk 
remains the same regardless of the residency of politically exposed person 
involved in the transaction or business relationship. In this respect, we 
propose de lege ferenda the inclusion in the legal text on enhanced diligence 
measures, article 121 letter c of Law no. 656 / 2002, and of resident 
politically exposed persons, as defined under article 21. 
4. Another aspect that we wanted to submit for discussion covers the period 
to be considered by the reporting entities at establishing the quality of the 
politically exposed person and implicitly the implementation based on risk, 
of additional diligence measures. The international standards have not 
imposed any time limit or period in which the client is considered to act as a 
politically exposed person after the important public function is no longer 
occupied by him. We believe that in certain situations it is no longer 
necessary to set a deadline after which the customer would not act as a 
politically exposed person, such as the Heads of State or Government. At 
the same time, establishing indefinite period for all persons considered 
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politically exposed is not correct, given that most of the times, the exercise 
of official public office is short. In our opinion, in order to be effective the 
establishment of the level of risk of money laundering or terrorism 
financing, a person who has held important public position, but not 
exercised such function, it needs to be reported at the level of each 
professional entity a specialized body with responsibilities in client situation 
analysis, in order to determine regardless of the time elapsed since the 
termination of that position, so far as these people continue to experience 
increased risk of money laundering or terrorism financing. De lege ferenda 
law, we propose in a future regulation, an increase of 1 year term provided 
by article 21 line 6 to 5 years. 
5. Also, given the conclusions of MONEYVAL experts on the sanctioning 
regime applicable for Romania in case of breaching the measures to prevent 
and combat money laundering, they are calling into doubt the effectiveness 
of global sanctioning regime in this area. (Moneyval, 2008, p. 198)1, we 
consider that that the non-compliance of the obligations referred to in article 
4 of Law no 656/2002, to be provided as an offense by the Romanian 
legislator. In this respect, we propose de lege ferenda, amending article 24 
of Law no. 656 / 2002, with the following content: Failure to comply with 
the obligations provided in article 4 and 18 is an offense and it is 
punishable with imprisonment for 2-7 years. 
6. According to the analysis of solutions given in the legal practice in the 
field of money laundering offense independently of the existence of a prior 
or simultaneous conviction for the predicate offense, we found that case law 
is inconsistent in the interpretation of article 23 of Law no. 656/2002, some 
courts released the defendants for the offense of money laundering in cases 
where they could not incriminate them for committing generating crimes of 
dirty money.2 In our view, given that Romania has ratified the Warsaw 
Convention (2005), according to which each party shall ensure that a prior 
or simultaneous conviction for a predicate offense is not a prerequisite for a 
conviction for money laundering, by conditioning the conviction for money 
laundering of the existence of a conviction for the generating offense of 
dirty money; the authorities will be unable to act against members of 
organized crime groups whose assets of illicit origin cannot be confiscated 
or taxed, unless there is a conviction for committing a predicate offense. In 
this respect, in order to avoid the dilemmas of interpretation of the law and 
                                                 
1
 Available at http://www.coe.int  
2
 Î.C.C.J., S. Pen., Dec. no. 5685 / 2005, www.scj.ro. 
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to ensure a uniform interpretation in the judicial practice of article 23 of 
Law no. 656/2002, we suggest the replacement of the offense with criminal 
activity in the phrase knowing that they come from offenses. 
7. On the measure of access and surveillance of telecommunications or 
computer systems, covered by Procedural Penal Code, in article 911-916 and 
in article 57 of Law no. 161 / 19 April 2003 on some measures to ensure 
transparency in exercising the public dignities, public functions and in 
business environment, the prevention and punishment of corruption, the 
Romanian legislator provides for the reasoned authorization of the judge of 
this measure at the request of the prosecutor who performs or supervises the 
prosecution, under the law, if there are given data or solid clues for the 
preparation or commission of an offense for which the prosecution is 
performed ex officio, and the interception and the recording are required to 
establish the facts or that the identification or location of the participants 
cannot be achieved by other means or the investigation would be much 
delayed. Regarding the duration of the authorization, it shall not exceed 30 
days, with the possibility of being extended with no more than 4 months. 
We propose de lege ferenda, that the term of 120 days to be extended to180 
days, following the example of the German law, which provides in the 
Criminal Procedure Code to Section 100d the duration of the permit of 30 
days with the possibility of extension, and in case the total duration of the 
permit has exceeded six months, the Federal Supreme Court must rule on a 
possible extension. This period should be sufficient to ensure the 
effectiveness of this measure. 
8. In order to improve the special studied investigative measures, the law 
enforcement authorities charged with these measures must be trained and 
qualified to do so. We consider, de lege ferenda, that at the level of our 
legislation it should be expressly provided the requirement of qualification 
and perfecting of both the bodies applying the measure, as well as those 
who coordinate and supervise the investigated crimes by using these 
measures. (Hotcă & Dobrinoiu, 2008, pp. 329-335)1 
                                                 
1
 We mention in this regard that in some countries (Germany and France) the police units in order to 
collect the necessary information proving such complex crime, they have access to all databases 
under the supervision of the prosecutor. In Romania, the access to bank data is only possible under a 
court decision and is conditioned by the existence of some evidence. By analyzing the payments and 
bank transfers it is established the financial flow of the offender and of other persons associated with 
him. Under these laws, the police, which investigates the money laundering acts are specialists in 
financial and economic analysis and in informatics. 
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9. Regarding the duration of the detention in cases of money laundering, we 
consider the term set out in article 144 Procedural Criminal Code1 of at least 
24 hours is insufficient for prosecutors to prepare all necessary documents 
for starting the prosecution. We argue this view by pointing out that often 
enough, in these cases there is an organized crime group involved in 
complex money laundering scheme, which means retaining more people 
who are not in the same locality, conducting house searches, collecting data 
and deduction of the case to court, all actions of the investigation cannot be 
achieved within 24 hours. De lege ferenda, we propose to increase the term 
from 24 to 72 hours. We exemplify in this sense the legislation that 
expressly provides in article 17 line 2 of the Constitution as well as in article 
520 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the maximum detention of 72 hours. 
For suspects in crimes of terrorism and other facts also, the article 520 bis of 
the Criminal Procedure Law of Spain provides a duration of 5 days 
detention. (Savedra, 2010, p. 356) 
10. Regarding the moment when the studied evidence means can be used, 
we propose de lege ferenda, that the legislator regulates the possibility of 
their application also during the preliminary acts of the prosecution 
necessary to start the criminal investigation. By the possibility of requesting 
information of the reporting entities whose bank and professional secrecy is 
not unperfected to the investigating bodies of criminal prosecution in the 
phase of prior acts for starting a prosecution investigation is conferred on 
the effectiveness of investigative bodies.2 We proposes de lege ferenda the 
modification of these provisions in the sense of removing the unperfected 
the banking and professional secrecy during the phase of preliminary acts 
necessary to start the prosecution investigation. 
11. Regarding the terminology used in the current Procedural Penal Code as 
that used in the new Procedural Penal Code3 on the execution of special 
confiscation measure, we consider, de lege ferenda, that it should be 
                                                 
1
 According to article 144 of Procedural Criminal Code detention measure may take up to 24 hours. 
2
 For example, under the current regulation article 114 GEO no. 99/2006 on credit institutions and 
capital adequacy published in the Official Monitor no. 1027 to 1027. 12. 2006, the credit institutions 
are obliged to provide information on the nature of banking secrecy, after starting the prosecution 
investigation against a client, at the written request of the prosecutor or of the court or, where 
appropriate, criminal investigation bodies, with the authorization of the prosecutor. 
3
 According to article 574 of the new Procedural Criminal Code, the security measures of special 
confiscation taken by court decision runs as follows: a) if the confiscated things are guarded by the 
police or other institutions, the enforcement court sends a copy of the judgment body to where they 
are. After receiving a copy of the device, the confiscated things are given or asserted under the 
provisions of the law. 
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replaced with the terminology of assets as laid down in the legislation 
relating to special confiscation measure contained in article 118 of the 
Criminal Code. The term of things was used before changing article 118 of 
the Criminal Code1 by article I, section 42 of Law no. 278 / 2006 to amend 
and supplement the Criminal Code and for amending and supplementing 
other laws. In support of this proposal, we emphasize that the concept of 
things and assets are not synonymous, although they have common meaning 
of the material objects of ownership right belonging to a natural person or 
legal entity. Unlike things, assets have the ability to be appropriated, that is 
to become material objects of ownership right, having an economic value. 
(Hungarian, 2005) 
12. De lege ferenda, we propose the Romanian legislator regulate the 
possibility of unavailability of the suspected persons for committing money 
laundering of assets which are subject to confiscation even from the 
preceding acts phase, because in this phase and until starting the criminal 
prosecution the money launderer may dispose of assets or other values 
obtained illicitly which is the subject of safety measures that are applied 
after starting the prosecution investigation. 
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